

Witness: Sir Paul Stephenson
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The Leveson Inquiry into the Culture Practices and Ethics of the Press

Witness: Sir Paul Stephenson

Address: c/o Metropolitan Police Service, New Scotland Yard

1. I have been asked to provide this statement for the purpose of assisting the Leveson Inquiry. In preparing it I have sought to address all the questions asked of me in the Notice served pursuant to s.21 (2) of the Inquiries Act 2005. I begin each section of this statement by listing the questions to which I am responding
2. In addressing the questions raised by the Inquiry, I describe matters as they were at the time I was serving in the police forces concerned; things may have changed since I left each force. My recollection of the matters I refer to in this statement is not perfect, especially in respect of events that occurred some time ago. I have also had to seek assistance from the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) in providing some of the detail sought. However, the contents of this statement are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Personal History

Q.1 - Who you are and a brief summary of your career history

3. I was appointed the Commissioner of the MPS on 28th January 2009. I had been the Acting Commissioner (AC) since 1st December 2008. Prior to that I was the Deputy Commissioner, an appointment I took up on 16th March 2005.
4. In outline, my previous career had been as follows:
5. I joined Lancashire Constabulary in 1975 and was appointed to the rank of Superintendent in February 1988. Following a post in research and development I took operational commands; first in Lancashire and then in Northern Ireland with the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC).
6. I was appointed Assistant Chief Constable of Merseyside Police in October 1994. On 1st May 1999 I was appointed Deputy Chief Constable of Lancashire Constabulary,
7. I was appointed Chief Constable of Lancashire Constabulary on 25th July 2002. During this period I was also the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) lead on Crime.
8. I was awarded the Queen's Policing Medal for services to policing in May 2000 and I received a knighthood in the Queen's Birthday Honours List of June 2008.
9. I gave notice of my intention to resign from the MPS on 17th July 2011 and formally left office on 26th July 2011.

The Culture of Relations between the MPS and the media

Q.2 – What were your impressions over the years about the culture of relations between the MPS and the media?

Q14 - What mechanisms were in place to monitor and record meetings with the media generally?

Q24 - Set out your understanding of the type of contact which Metropolitan Police personnel have had with the media covering nature, extent, and (in general terms) topics / content.

Q25 - Were contacts with the media restricted to certain staff or were all staff able to deal with the media?

Q26 - What did you expect the Metropolitan Police to gain from such contacts with the media?

Q27 - What did the media seek from such contacts with your personnel?

Q33 - What policies and procedures were in place to record contact between: (a) the Commissioner and the media; (b) senior managers and the media; (c) other personnel and the media? For the avoidance of doubt please answer in relation to both formal and informal communications

Q34 - Were record of hospitality and other contact with the media audited and/or policed and, if so how and by whom?

Q35 - In your opinion did the policies and procedures described above: (a) work effectively; (b) were they sufficient; (c) were they transparent enough; and (d) were they capable of improvement?

Q36 - What systems, policies and procedures were in place in the Metropolitan police to ensure that all members of the force (including civilian employees) know what was and what was not appropriate contact with the media?

Q37 - Were you satisfied that the policies and procedures described above were sufficient and worked effectively? Did you consider that they were capable of improvement?

Q38 - What training was in place in the Metropolitan police to ensure that all members of the force (including civilian employees) knew what was and what was not appropriate contact with the media?

Q.82 What is your current impression of the culture within the MPS in relation to its dealings with the press?

10. I believe that it is important that the MPS maintains a healthy working relationship with the media. Given the need to build and maintain public confidence in the police, the need to seek public support for our work and the impact of both national and local media reporting on police morale and organisational confidence, this relationship is an important one.

11. The reasons I regarded it as important when I became Commissioner to maintain good relations with the media might be summarised as follows:
- a. Communicating with Londoners is vital. It is a two way process: an example of where Londoners can be said to be our “eyes and ears” on the street and in our communities is in the arena of counter-terrorism. Communication is a critical part of how we seek to inform the public of their invaluable role in assisting to keep the country safe.
 - b. It would help to promote better informed media coverage, providing the context for the challenges faced by the MPS. In this way it would help achieve a fairer and more balanced picture in the media of the work being done by the MPS. Over 50,000 people work for the MPS on behalf of the people of London. Overwhelmingly, they performed their often difficult tasks with integrity and professionalism.
 - c. It would provide a means by which feedback could be sought from senior media figures as to how they saw the MPS. I believe it is a feature of good leadership to view one’s organisation through the eyes of others, with the media providing one such source.
 - d. It would enable us to seek to reverse the generally negative coverage of the MPS that had been my experience during my Deputy Commissionership. This was essential given the media’s potential and real effect on public confidence in policing.

- e. It would assist me in fulfilling my duty as a professional leader to inform local, regional and national debates on issues of policing and security.
12. I referred to our role in informing the debate on policing in a speech I gave on 15th September 2009 to the Superintendents' Association (which is exhibited as SPS/1). I stressed the need for police presence to be enhanced through good use of communication and to engage people through new technologies as well as the more traditional forms of media, i.e. newspapers, radio, television etc.
13. Given the size of the MPS and of London, and the national and international nature of the MPS' work, it is inevitable that its relationship with the media is different from that of provincial police forces, hugely important as their work is. Additionally, whereas provincial forces deal largely with local and regional media and less frequently with the national press, there is a relentless interest and pressure upon the MPS and the office of Commissioner from the national and international media which is substantially based in London.
14. At a senior level within the MPS, relationships with the media vary, dependent upon the role and nature of the individuals concerned. It is obvious that different Commissioners have enjoyed different relationships with the press, with some experiencing more positive and supportive coverage than others. During my period as Deputy Commissioner the then Commissioner, Sir Ian Blair (now Lord Blair), was the target of a great deal of negative publicity. Lord Blair had succeeded

a Commissioner, Sir John Stevens (now Lord Stevens), who had been widely considered to be highly successful and had been very popular with the media. He was a gregarious, larger than life character and a very difficult act to follow.

15. The negative press coverage Lord Blair received created an unnecessary distraction for senior staff and was an unfair reflection on the wider efforts of the organisation, as well as on the Commissioner himself. Witnessing the distractions caused by such publicity played a significant role in forming my view on the requirement for engagement with figures within the media and, indeed, on the behaviour of my senior staff during my Commissionership.
16. It was also my view upon taking up my post as Deputy Commissioner in 2005, and subsequently, that some of the contact between the written media in particular and a small number of senior colleagues was closer than I considered necessary.
17. I believe that the policies and procedures covering contact with the media were largely effective in that the overwhelming majority of officers and staff conducted themselves with integrity and professionalism. However, I was keen to ensure that this was the approach of all officers. When I joined the MPS as Deputy Commissioner I moved to have a representative from the Directorate of Public Affairs (DPA) present during engagements with the media. I also had hospitality registers published and, more latterly, issued guidelines about members of Management Board making notes of conversations with journalists (these can be found

at tabs A and B of the MPS Master Bundle). I considered these to be useful steps forward. Most arrangements are capable of improvements over time, however, and that is why I commissioned Elizabeth Filkin to take an independent look at the MPS policies and procedures and to make recommendations for further improvements.

18. The type of contact which MPS personnel had with the media included press conferences, broadcast and written interviews, providing press releases, answering press inquiries and crime appeals. Contact varied depending on the issue and the person involved: it could range from providing the details of a charge on an investigation to speaking about a crime prevention campaign or providing context to public order matters. Individuals involved would include Safer Neighbourhood officers, detectives, press officers and senior management.
19. MPS policy was that any officer of Inspector rank or above could talk to the media about their area of business. Anyone below this rank had to seek their line manager's permission. Officers would engage with the media for a variety of reasons, including to publicise appeals and to provide them with details of current policing issues in their locality. This would serve to increase public understanding of policing; it provided public scrutiny of police actions and policies; and it helped to get information to the public concerning crime appeals or other issues.
20. The media would require all kinds of information for news items, features and documentaries, etc. Communicating with the local media was very

important for officers on the ground in order that they could cover matters of local interest.

21. I understand that media awareness and broadcast training was run by DPA on roughly a monthly basis for officers and staff who were likely to have contact with the media. Press Officers would also provide input into training days as appropriate. In addition to this the department provided a number of bespoke media training sessions for new Borough Commanders involving a critical incident scenario developing over one day. DPA would also provide training using examples of TV and radio interviews, a press conference and breakout discussion groups.
22. The overwhelming majority of staff who work for the MPS would have had little reason to deal with the media and I am confident that, of those that did, the vast majority would act with integrity and professionalism.
23. I mentioned earlier my personal impression of relationships between some senior levels of the MPS and the media upon my first joining the MPS as Deputy Commissioner in 2005. There were frequent newspaper stories of disharmony within the MPS senior management. I believed it was likely that some of this reporting emanated from a small number of self-interested officers, who either leaked to the media themselves or gossiped to others who did. Accordingly I made it a priority of my Commissionership to ensure that this behaviour did not continue. This reinforced my view that meetings between senior MPS officers and members of the media should be conducted wherever possible in the presence of a DPA representative.

24. Of course I realised that how effectively this worked was to a large extent dependent upon the individuals appointed to key senior positions. I believe I was most fortunate that during my time we put in place a team of highly professional people who were as determined as I was not to see a repeat of such behaviour.
25. It was my belief that on occasions there was a danger of the organisation, including senior officers, becoming too obsessed with newspaper headlines. In my view the more important issue, particularly for the senior leadership, was to concentrate on making further improvements in our internal communications, with the aim being to turn 50,000 employees into effective "press people". I also believed we should develop our capability to communicate directly with the people we served. These were both issues on which I was looking to make major progress during the remainder of my Commissionership, with the aim of making the story of the MPS a little less reliant on daily headlines, which did not always represent a full and balanced picture of what we were doing.
26. I believe the occurrence of leaks from senior officers substantially reduced during the period of my Commissionership. It is also worth observing, as I pointed out at Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) meetings, that there was a culture of unofficial briefings, gossiping and leaking by people associated with the police but from outside the MPS, who were often referred to in the press as a 'police source'. I considered this to be one of the most disappointing and frustrating aspects of public life in London.

27. I believe there was, and perhaps is, a view held by some in positions of influence to the effect that the majority of police officers gossip and leak information to the media. This is simply not the case. However, any such perception, wholly untrue though it may be, is damaging. That is why it was important to engage with Elizabeth Filkin in her work. (a copy of her report can be found in the MPS Master Bundle - Reports).

Personal Contact with the Media

Q3 - Describe the personal contact which you had with the media at the various stages of your career. The Inquiry would like an overall picture of the type, frequency, duration and content of your contact with the media.

Q4 - Without prejudice to the generality of question (3) above, please set out the contact which you had with the following persons employed by (or formerly employed by) News International, giving the dates and summarising the gist of the communications which you had with: (a) Neil Wallis; (b) Rebekah Brooks; (c) Andy Coulson; (d) Colin Myler.

Q5 - Describe what you were seeking to gain for the Metropolitan Police through your personal contacts with the media.

Q6 - Describe in general terms and using illustrative examples what you consider the media has been seeking from you in your personal dealing with them during your career.

Q13 - In relation to hospitality either afforded to or received from the News of the World, or its employees, please specify in detail the level of contact which you had with them so that the Inquiry has a full picture of the same.

Q17 - Whilst you were Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, did you ever meet either James or Rupert Murdoch? If so, please give full particulars.

Q18 - Are you aware of any meeting between James or Rupert Murdoch and any member of the MPS? If so, please give full particulars.

28. My personal contact with the media would take the form of meetings, functions and attendances at events run by various organisations such as the Crime Reporters Association (CRA). Additionally, on occasions, there would be meetings with editors, drinks receptions or meetings over lunch/dinner. A list of my meetings and engagements with the media is exhibited as SPS/2. It is likely that this list is not entirely comprehensive,

as meetings would often have to be rescheduled by one or other party at short notice due to urgent matters arising.

29. As previously stated media relations are very different at the MPS compared to media contact when serving with a regional force. During my junior service in Lancashire, contact with the media was almost non-existent. Upon taking up middle management positions this extended to more limited contact with local town media consisting of occasional interviews or discussions with local newspaper editors. After attaining chief officer rank (Assistant Chief Constable) in Merseyside, I experienced greater contact with both local and more regional media outlets. This consisted of occasional interviews, but also some meetings relating to coverage which we believed was inaccurate or unfair. The latter was particularly the case during my time in Merseyside, where we were experiencing some difficulties regarding the nature of coverage and leaks from our organisation. This included meetings with the media at senior and editorial level.
30. My period as Deputy Chief Constable and Chief Constable in Lancashire was not dissimilar in terms of the nature of my relationship with the media, again largely limited to regional media interviews, including written and broadcast.
31. Although any social contact was, at most, limited, there would inevitably have been occasions where both media representatives and I attended the same functions.

32. As Chief Constable of Lancashire, and in particular as Chair of the Crime Committee for ACPO, I provided some national written and broadcast interviews, though these were few in number.
33. I have been asked about contact with specific people employed by News International. The list exhibited as SPS/2 should, from my recollection, have a record of most of my meetings with these people (although as stated above it may have inaccuracies due to meetings being arranged or cancelled at short notice). It would be my press adviser who would advise me which papers I should speak to. I understand that approximately 30% of all my engagements with media figures were with News International representatives. I also understand that at that time News International had some 42% of the total UK newspaper readership. This suggests, given my reasons for wanting to speak to the press, that we were distributing these meetings rationally.
34. I believe I was introduced to James Murdoch twice. On the first occasion I met him in passing whilst at a meeting at the office of Rebekah Brooks. The second time was at a News International drinks party which would also be attended by senior members of the Government, including the Prime Minister. Our conversation amounted to no more than cursory greetings. I also met Rupert Murdoch at the same function. Dick Fedorcio, the Director of DPA when I was in office, advised me which functions of this sort I should attend and was present on the occasions I refer to above. I am not aware of any other meeting with either James or Rupert Murdoch.

35. I cannot recall the details of my conversations with News International personnel but the gist of the conversations would be in line with conversations with any other representatives from the media, i.e. general and specific policing matters.
36. Upon taking office I made it clear that I did not wish to become a "celebrity" and my dealings with the media were always conducted with this in mind. My purpose was to try to get the media to focus less on the senior officers and more on what the organisation did. Indeed during my Commissionership I believe I suffered some negative commentary for taking too low a personal profile.
37. At the level of editor and senior responsible journalist, there was genuine interest in the views of the Commissioner about how I saw the policing challenge both current and future, the context for that challenge and about particular broad issues of crime, national security and public order. There was also interest in the key issues of leadership, not just the policing of the capital, safeguarding the Royal Family and senior members of Government, but of leading such a large workforce upon whom Londoners and the wider public depended for their security. In keeping with this there would be constant requests by media outlets for me to provide interviews, and when I believed this to be beneficial to the MPS and its mission, I would do so.
38. Clearly the opportunity to garner information on stories not in the possession of media rivals would provide additional motivation for the press. It was not uncommon, either during meetings with senior media

figures or indeed during the monthly Commissioner's CRA briefings at New Scotland Yard for me to be asked for confidential or sensitive operational information regarding major criminal investigations of which I was aware. On no occasion during my career have I ever improperly disclosed such information.

39. Further, it was my clear view, gained through both personal contacts with media representatives and consistent advice from my Director of Public Affairs, Dick Fedorcio, that all sections of the media believed and complained that their rivals were given greater access than they were; this included News International titles.

Hospitality and Gifts

Q7 - To what extent did you accept hospitality from the media?

Q8 - Insofar as you accepted hospitality from the media, what was the nature of the hospitality that you accepted?

Q9 - To what extent did you provide hospitality for the media on behalf of the Metropolitan Police Service?

Q10 - Insofar as you provided hospitality to the media, what was the nature of the hospitality that you provided?

Q11 - What mechanisms were in place to monitor and record hospitality as between the Commissioner and the media?

Q28 - What hospitality were MPS personnel permitted to accept from the media? Inter alia, were they entitled to accept a meal or a drink from a journalist?

Q29 - What hospitality were personnel permitted to afford to the media?

Q30 - What mechanisms were in place to record hospitality as between the media and MPS personnel?

Q31 - How (if at all) was hospitality between the MPS (including yourself) and the media controlled and/or regulated?

Q32 - Were the hospitality rules governing contact between MPS personnel (including yourself) and the media different from those covering contact with other third parties? If so, what were the differences?

40. All hospitality should be recorded in the Gifts and Hospitality Register, which is then published on the MPS website. My recollection was that it was submitted quarterly or so to the MPA. My understanding is that the existing gifts and hospitality policy (which can be found at tab B of the MPS Master Bundle) does not prevent a meal or drink being accepted from the media but I am not aware of a specific policy on what hospitality police personnel were permitted to afford to the media. My Hospitality Register can be found in the MPS Master Bundle - Gifts and Hospitality. The entries were made on my behalf by my private office based on my diary. As stated above with respect to meetings, although my diary recorded everything that was planned and agreed to, it may not have been corrected when (as often happened) events were cancelled at the last minute due to other work commitments. Also it may not have included unplanned variations to pre-arranged events or meetings.
41. For example, on one occasion I recall going for a drink with a politician after an organised event. I believe we were accompanied by two journalists. The planned event would have been recorded in the Hospitality Register but an unplanned, informal meeting like this drink afterwards might not have been recorded as it would have been seen as an extension of the main function.
42. With regard to providing hospitality to the media I can say that, on a few occasions, I personally paid for some drinks for which I did not seek reimbursement from the MPS. My view was that there were very few occasions when it would be appropriate for the public purse to pay for

alcoholic drinks, even where alcohol was a normal accompaniment to a legitimate business engagement.

43. The MPS occasionally hosted a reception at New Scotland Yard (NSY) for the press. I recall, for example, that we hosted a dinner at NSY after Andy Coulson had been appointed Head of Communications at Number 10. Neil Wallis also attended this function. The purpose of the function was to enable us to get to know Mr Coulson and his assistant Ed Llewellyn, both of whom were important figures at the heart of government, to tell them what we regarded as important and to get a sense of how they saw policing in London.
44. I am informed that the hospitality rules govern contact with all third parties, which would include media, and that this policy is being reviewed.

Champneys

Q12 - In relation to the hospitality which you accepted at Champneys, please specify;

- a. The hospitality which you accepted;
- b. The person who offered the hospitality;
- c. When the hospitality was offered and how;
- d. Your reason for accepting the hospitality;
- e. How you accepted the hospitality;
- f. When you first formally declared the hospitality;
- g. When you first knew that there was a connection between Champneys and Neil Wallis?
- h. How you found out that there was a connection between Champneys and Neil Wallis?
- i. Whether you ever discussed either your need for rehabilitative treatment and/or your stay at Champneys with Neil Wallis, whether formally or informally, before or after your stay? If so, please give full particulars.
- j. Whether to your knowledge (now or then) Neil Wallis played any role whatsoever in securing or influencing the offer of a stay at Champneys for you? If so, what was that role?

Q16 - Did you discuss the offer and/or your acceptance of hospitality at Champneys with any member of your Police Authority or any politician? If so, identify the politician/s and set out the date/s and gist of the communication/s.

45. The offer to stay at Champneys was an act of kindness by the owner, Steven Purdue, who was a friend through my family (he is my daughter's father-in-law). This gesture was made in January 2011 following surgery I had undergone to remove a cancerous tumour from within my femur subsequently followed by a fracture of that bone. Having heard about my illness Mr Purdue passed a message to me expressing a wish to do whatever he could to help. He allowed me to have a room for a five week period as I recall it. I generally spent weekday nights there. This provided me with the opportunity to use the centre's rehabilitative facilities to assist in my recovery. I was largely confined to a wheelchair during this period. This gesture covered accommodation and some meals, with all treatments and facilities paid for separately; the MPS paid for physiotherapy and I paid for some other therapies.
46. Initially I was reluctant to accept this offer. There is, I think, often a reluctance to accept an act of generosity from another and I was not keen to be away from home at that time. However, I had been advised by the MPS Occupational Health Department that I was not fit or well enough to attend any of the existing police rehabilitative centres, (although I did attend Goring (one of the centres) at a later date when my state of health had improved). I was determined to do everything possible to return to my duties as Commissioner as soon as possible after my illness, despite this being very much against the medical advice I had received.
47. I was acutely conscious that my continued lengthy absence from office would be likely to have a destabilising effect on the organisation. Indeed

this was to some extent evidenced by media speculation during this period. For these reasons, I felt under considerable personal pressure to return to office and did not consider that the even longer period of absence envisaged by medical advisors would be consistent with my remaining in office at that time.

48. It is a matter of record that I did return to office significantly ahead of all predictions, and I am in no doubt that the facilities and treatments I was able to access so early in my rehabilitation at Champneys was the major factor in this achievement. Indeed, even after returning to work I continued to have a number of rehabilitative treatments at Champneys, at my own expense.
49. My private office and staff at NSY were made fully aware of my intentions and whereabouts during this time. I understand that the Chief Executive and Chair of the MPA were also aware of my use of those facilities, the reasons why I was there and that the offer to stay had been made through a personal contact. I recollect raising the matter in discussion with the Chair and Chief Executive at one of our regular informal Friday morning meetings. I do not recall discussing the matter with any other politician. I have made it clear that I did not consider my stay at Champneys a secret and a number of people would have been aware of it.
50. Although this was a private arrangement through a family friend whose company, Champneys Healthcare, had no procurement history or activity with the MPS, I instructed that the arrangements should be recorded in

my Gifts and Hospitality Register. I was, of course, aware this would be audited by the MPA and then published in due course.

51. Neil Wallis, to my knowledge, played no part in these arrangements. I had no knowledge of any connection between him and Champneys either before or during my stay and I am not aware of anyone at the MPS who would have been aware of such a connection. I first became aware of a connection between Neil Wallis and Champneys on the morning of Saturday 16th July 2011 following a telephone call from a member of the DPA after there had been a media enquiry about it. I did not discuss my arrangements regarding Champneys with Neil Wallis.

Politicians

Q15 - Did you ever discuss the media, or media coverage, with politicians? If so, how important is such communication and why?

Q19 - Did you ever know, or sense, that a politician has put pressure on you to take a particular course of action as a result of lobbying or influence exerted on that politician by the media? If so, please explain (although you need not identify the politician at this stage if you do not wish to do so).

Q20 - Did the prominence which politicians have given to subjects ever give rise to pressure to alter policing priorities so as to allocate more priority to the subject being given prominence by the politicians? If so, please explain.

52. I believe it is the community - whether through elected politicians or individual citizens - who should tell us what they believe their Police Service should be concentrating on, targeting and working towards. The caveat to this is that the Police Service itself retains at all times the essential operational independence to decide how to bring about and carry out those general and justifiable aspirations. I believed, and still do believe, in the principle of police operational independence. However,

politics and policing will always co-exist and it is the right and duty of politicians to establish the overarching framework for policing, to inform our priorities, help ensure we have the resources to deliver them and hold us to account through established governance mechanisms.

53. My senior officers and I regularly met with the Mayor and senior members of the MPA to discuss policing policy and related issues. However, whilst wider views and opinions are helpful and to be encouraged, the decisions of how to actually carry out the job of "policing" are for the Commissioner and his officers. Operational independence should not be compromised - it is our responsibility and our duty. I do not think that any sensible politician would think otherwise. Conversely, it has always been my firm belief that the police have no role in politics. The police service is not part of nor the arm of any administration or of any government - we are a servant for the whole community.

54. It is right and proper to discuss many aspects of policing with politicians, both within and outside the formal governance structures. This includes, of course, MPS interaction with the media. This is particularly so as many of the issues involving the MPS will have received significant media coverage. I recall receiving advice from various politicians on a number of occasions as to how we could better deal with the media – indeed it was not just politicians who offered advice on such matters. As with all advice, I would have listened to it and accepted or rejected it on the basis of what I considered to be both useful and proper. Additionally, such discussions were naturally part of the round of public MPA governance

meetings and also the subject of informal weekly meetings with the Chief Executive and successive Chairs of the MPA.

55. Politicians have a hugely important role in the formal governance mechanisms for policing. It is my firm belief that policing is too important to be left to police alone. Beyond that formal role, it has been my experience that politicians of every description lobby their local police chief, attempting to persuade them to pay greater prominence to their own particular concerns, which include the geographical area they represent and the particular causes they are associated with. That this may sometimes coincide with electoral cycles and issues that a particular politician is promoting within the media should come as no surprise. As to who is putting pressure on whom, i.e. politician on media or vice versa, this is a little like debating the chicken and the egg.
56. However, I can say that no politician successfully lobbied or influenced me to take an operational decision or alter any operational priorities for the assets under my command where I had not believed this to be professionally appropriate. It is of course the case that politicians, particularly in local authorities, sometimes provide additional resources over and above their share from the general allocation of resources available, in order to deal with particular local priorities. For example, shortly after Boris Johnson was elected Mayor of London he told the MPS that he wanted to see more officers on buses in order to protect passengers and make them feel more secure. We explained that in order to do this we would require extra resources. He provided additional funding and we implemented his suggestion. This proved to be

successful and I recall that crime on buses subsequently fell by 18%. Subject to some general caveats regarding line management and ultimate command and control responsibilities such arrangements can be properly agreed to.

Leaks / Disciplinary - Directorate of Professional Standards

Q39 - To what extent were leaks from the Metropolitan Police Service to the media a problem during your career with the MPS?

Q40 - What systems and procedures were in place to identify, respond to and detect the source of leaks?

Q41 - Whilst you were the Commissioner, how many investigations were conducted into actual or suspected leaks from the Metropolitan Police Service and how many led to the successful identification of the source of the leak. What was the outcome of the other investigations?

Q42 - Was disciplinary action been taken against any member of staff (whether civilian or uniformed) for leaking information to the media whilst you were the Commissioner? If so, please identify the number of cases and their outcome. There is no need to identify the person or persons the subject of the disciplinary process.

Q43 - What payments (if any) were considered to be legitimate financial transactions between MPS personnel and the media?

Q44 - What policies and/or guidance were in place in relation to financial transactions between MPS personnel and the media.

57. In view of the MPS' size and the volume of valuable information which it holds information misuse and leaks to the media are always a risk. Set against the number of people the MPS employ, the number of such events was relatively low. Nonetheless the fact that they occurred at all represented a real problem; their effect is potentially much greater than the frequency of their occurrence would suggest. It is an issue for all major forces across the world and indeed for similar organisations. This was a problem that I had faced in my career at Merseyside Police, where leaks to the media by officers undermined the image of the overwhelming majority of staff who were honest and professional. I believe the MPS

must always remain vigilant to the risk and reality of corrupt or irresponsible behaviour by a few.

58. I am informed that the MPS Security Board (MetSec) has strategic oversight of all information usage issues. The Professional Standards Strategic Committee (chaired by the Deputy Commissioner) also oversees work on the specific issue of preventing information misuse.
59. In addition to the proactive steps taken by these parts of the Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS), leaks to the media are also identified through subsequent complaints made to the MPS. These are evaluated by the DPS Customer Service Team and then allocated to the relevant DPS Investigation team to follow up.
60. I am informed that the DPS conduct audits in response to information or intelligence triggers collected from all areas of the MPS and other law enforcement agencies.
61. I am also informed that 16 police officers and police staff have been prosecuted for misusing police information over the past decade, of whom 11 were found or pleaded guilty. 29 police officers and police staff have been dismissed or asked to resign and 208 disciplined for misusing police information over the past decade. I understand that the numbers of officers/staff disciplined for misuse of information has remained stable in the past three years.
62. I have been asked whether any payments were considered to be legitimate financial transactions between MPS personnel and the media.

I am told that the Gifts and Hospitality Policy covers this with regard to payments made for interviews, broadcasts or for speaking at an external event. Subject to the following conditions payment can be retained by the individual: if the subject is unconnected with their normal duties; membership of the MPS is not an integral part of the interview/broadcast; the matter has been reported to a supervisor and prior approval obtained; and the interview/broadcast/event does not take place during MPS time or using MPS facilities.

Bribery

Q45 - To what extent do you believe bribery of personnel by the media was a problem for the Metropolitan Police Service (if at all)?

Q46 - What steps were taken: (a) to educate your personnel about bribery; (b) otherwise to prevent the bribery of your personnel; (c) pro-actively to detect bribery; (d) retrospectively to investigate bribery; and (e) to discipline personnel (if any) who are found to have accepted bribes from the media?

63. The DPS deal with all aspects of bribery offences committed, or alleged to have been committed, by MPS personnel, and with all attempts to bribe MPS personnel. The Anti-Corruption Command of the DPS conducts all pro-active investigations into these offences whilst the Specialist Investigations Unit deals with retrospective investigations.

64. I am reminded that any intelligence or information giving rise to allegations of bribery is examined within the DPS Intelligence Bureau and, when corruption is suspected, passed to one of the above units for full investigation. Any member of MPS personnel found to have accepted bribes will, where there is sufficient evidence, be subject to criminal charges or disciplinary procedures as appropriate.

65. I am informed that the topic of bribery is covered with student officers under Professional Standards training on "Gifts and Gratuities". This includes Special Constables and Police Community Support Officers.
66. The MPS Professional Standards Support Programme (PSSP) of 2009-2010 trained operational front line staff on how to deal with a corrupt approach from a case study. I understand that PSSP has also covered debt awareness and the dangers of over-exposure to social networking and dating sites - several officers and staff have had elements of their private life exposed by journalists through such means.
67. I have no doubt that incidents of bribery of police officers do occur. When they occur they undermine the integrity of the force and damage the reputation of the service significantly. However, I am equally confident that it is only a tiny fraction of MPS staff who are involved in such activity. The MPS take the risk of such offending very seriously and despite the low numbers involved are never complacent about the risk.

Directorate of Public Affairs

Q47 - What role did the Metropolitan Police Service Directorate of Public Affairs (especially the Press Bureau) fulfil? What, in practice, did it do?

Q48 - How, in practice, did the media get access to you? Did the Head of Public Affairs act as a gatekeeper?

Q49 - To what extent did the Press Bureau exist to manage the Metropolitan Police Service's corporate image in the media?

Q50 - Why was it necessary for the MPS to have a Press Office, and what was your view as to its utility and role?

Q51 - What was the media's attitude towards the MPS Press Office? In particular, were they satisfied by the provision of information and the routing of communications through your press office or did they prefer direct contact with individual personnel within the MPS?

Q52 - How many personnel worked in the Press Bureau when you were Commissioner?

Q53 - How many of the personnel who worked in the Directorate of Public Affairs, including the Press Bureau, whilst you were Commissioner had previously worked for the News of the World? Insofar as you are able to please name them.

Q54 - How many of the personnel who worked in the Directorate of Public Affairs, including the Press Bureau, whilst you were Commissioner had previously worked for a title owned by Rupert Murdoch? Insofar as you are able to please name them?

Q55 - Do you know whether or not it is true that Neil Wallis sold crime stories to the media whilst working for the Metropolitan Police Service? Please explain what you know about this allegation. For the allegation see, for example, the article published by the Daily Telegraph online on 23 September 2011.

Q56 - What part, if any, did you have, whether formally, or informally, directly or indirectly, in Neil Wallis securing work at the Metropolitan Police Service?

Q57 - Did you in any way encourage the offer of work to Neil Wallis?

Q58 - When did you first know that Mr. Wallis was of interest to the Metropolitan Police Service in relation to the phone hacking investigation?

Q59 - When did you first know that Mr. Wallis was a suspect in the phone hacking investigation?

Q60 - When did you first tell: (a) the Mayor of London; (b) the Prime Minister that Mr. Wallis was a suspect? In each case, please explain the timing of the communication of the information.

Q61 - What part, if any, did you have, whether formally, or informally, directly or indirectly, in Neil Wallis' daughter securing work at the Metropolitan Police Service?

Q62 - Did you in any way encourage the offer of work to Neil Wallis' daughter?

Q66 - What limitations, if any, were there on staff from the Metropolitan Police Service leaving to work for the media and vice versa?

Q67 - Were records kept of those who joined the MPS from the media, or went on to work for the media after leaving the MPS? If so, please describe the system in place

Q68 - To the best of your knowledge were there any discernible patterns in the movement of personnel from the media into the MPS and vice versa?

68. The DPA provides professional communication services to support the MPS' aims. It had three branches - News, Publicity, Internal Communication and (I understand since January 2012 a fourth has been added) - Stakeholder Engagement - providing professional communications that support the full range of the MPS' work, from police operations and investigations to keeping the public informed and promoting and protecting the MPS' reputation. The 24-hour press office

is the busiest police press office in the UK. In practice it supports the organisation in promoting operational activity, running appeals, and providing information to the public, MPS staff and MPS stakeholders. It provides guidance to officers with regard to their interaction with the media. It is the channel by which the MPS gets messages across - it informs Londoners and builds confidence. It undertakes an advisory communication function and is both proactive and reactive.

69. If there was no press office then, due to the volume of media interest in the MPS, officers would regularly need to be taken away from front line duties in order to manage and respond to requests for information from the media and support the organisation in providing information to the public via the media.
70. During my time at the MPS, the DPA managed media requests for interviews with me, as they did with members of the Senior Management Team (SMT) and other officers within the organisation. Access to me would be arranged through the DPA. On rare occasions I would have direct contact with the media myself. For example, I recall that I once telephoned the editor of the *Evening Standard* when I believed a report was grossly unfair and the editor of the *News of the World* once telephoned me to provide information about the cricket bribery scandal.
71. The DPA Press Bureau is staffed 24 hours a day, 365 days a year and handles hundreds of calls every day from local, national and international journalists. Press Bureau staff work alongside colleagues from DPA press desks and DPA area press offices to give advice to officers and

staff. The Press Bureau provides an immediate response to events such as fatal collisions, shootings, murders or major incidents. All information is logged on a database that stores details of press releases and lines to be taken with regard to policing issues. The Press Bureau is part of the system which advises the organization on the management of reputational issues.

72. The DPA serves a number of other important functions. First, as I explained earlier, I believe it is vital that the MPS has an independent voice to try to promote and enhance its reputation and to explain the context in which the police service operates in order to seek a balance in media reporting. The DPA assist in dealing with press queries, managing messages around major events such as the Olympics and releasing details of incidents, arrests and public appeals for information.
73. Second, it is important that the MPS is, and is seen to be, separate from party politics. Allegations that the MPS was favouring one political party were made prior to my Commissionership. Although it was unjustified, these allegations were nevertheless deeply damaging and underpinned a major focus of my time as Commissioner in ensuring that no-one could accuse the MPS of that again. An independent public voice, responsibly employed, is essential. The DPA plays an important role in ensuring that impartiality.
74. Third, I am sure many media organisations would have preferred direct access to the Commissioner or other senior officers as they would wish to get exclusive stories. That was one of the reasons why I believed the

presence of a DPA representative was a very useful safeguard. The requirement for a note summarising meetings between senior officers and the media represented a further move to achieve greater transparency. However it would be naïve to believe that no direct access continues.

75. Recently questions have been asked as to whether DPA staff should join the MPS from media organisations. If the MPS is to recruit people with relevant experience this is necessarily going to include recruitment from the media. In particular, I am informed that there are some DPA staff who have previously worked for News International. Due to the substantial size of News International compared with other newspaper organisations it is perhaps not surprising that a number of DPA staff have worked there at some point in their career. Nor is it surprising that they would form a significant potential recruitment pool. To discriminate against people who had *News of the World* or News International experience would seem to me to be unjustified and possibly unlawful.
76. Questions have also been asked about the employment DPA staff take up when they leave the MPS. I have been asked whether there were any limitations on MPS staff leaving to work for the media. Depending on the nature and seniority of the appointment, restraint of trade clauses are sometimes included in contracts and compromise agreements. Most contracts, and most compromise agreements which include a confidentiality clause prohibiting the use of official information following termination of employment, will also remind the individual of their obligations under the Official Secrets Act.

77. A blanket approach to restricting an individual's ability to work in the media after the MPS might be considered unfair and over restrictive, especially in relation to junior staff. However it would be open for the MPS or the new Mayor's Office on Policing and Crime (MOPC) to negotiate such a restriction with any particular individual (especially if they are senior) and particularly if they are receiving any consideration for their termination. Again this would have to be reasonable in the circumstances and be compliant with employment law.
78. I am not aware of whether records are kept of those who joined the MPS from the media or who went to work for the media after leaving the MPS. I am not aware of any patterns in the movement of personnel from the media into the MPS and vice versa. However, I accept that in light of recent events and this Inquiry and because of the need to address any damaging perceptions, real or otherwise, this issue is perhaps worthy of future consideration.

Neil Wallis

79. I first met Mr Wallis in September 2006 because part of my role as Deputy Commissioner, and subsequently as Commissioner, was to engage with media representatives for the purposes outlined earlier. I am also aware that Mr Wallis was known to previous Commissioners.
80. In 2009 I discussed with Dick Fedorcio the long-term absence of his then deputy, Chris Webb, due to a very serious medical condition. I was concerned that in Mr Webb's absence Mr Fedorcio should have sufficient support. I played no part in the procurement process which led to the

contract being awarded to Neil Wallis. I had no role in letting contracts generally, of which there were many hundreds. However, at the time I would not have been discomforted by the fact that Mr Wallis was selected because I knew nothing to his detriment. This was a minor, part-time, non-public facing contract, which did not involve issues of policy. I believe that Mr Wallis provided some limited assistance in matters of tone, presentation and likely media impact. He was never employed to be my personal assistant or to provide any significant personal advice directly to me.

81. Neil Wallis' extensive media experience would have probably been of assistance to Mr Fedorcio. As stated, nothing was suggested to me to his detriment. His name had not, to my knowledge, been linked to phone hacking at this time. He had not been required to resign following the original phone hacking convictions and he had continued to work for the *News of the World* for a considerable period after that. I had no reason at that time to doubt the efficacy of the original phone hacking investigation. I had played no role in that operation and had no detailed knowledge of it. I had seen senior News International figures claiming that phone hacking was the practice of a rogue reporter. Moreover, the man who did resign and who had been Mr Wallis' senior - Andy Coulson - had subsequently been re-employed advising at the highest levels of government. Therefore, having played no part in engaging Mr Wallis, I was aware of no issues that could reasonably raise any level of suspicion or concern.

82. I had no reason at all to associate Mr Wallis' name with phone hacking until January 2011, when I first saw his name mentioned publicly in that context. I believe that the first time I knew that Mr Wallis was of interest to Operation Weeting was on my return from sick leave in April 2011. I was told thereafter that he was a suspect.
83. I asked to be personally kept aware of any significant developments in Operation Weeting regarding individuals who I may be meeting in the general course of discharging my role as Commissioner. I did not want or need to know more for operational security reasons. Whilst I had been made aware that Mr Wallis was a suspect in the investigation, it was only a few days before his actual arrest took place that I was told he might be arrested. It was only on the 14th July 2011 that I was told that he was, in fact, being arrested that day. Although I appreciated that his being arrested was a potential outcome of the investigation, it was not for me to make such a presumption at any earlier stage. To do so would have placed improper pressure on those tasked with running the investigation.
84. I told the Chair of the MPA, Kit Malthouse, of the MPS' contractual arrangements with Neil Wallis on the morning of his arrest (14th July 2011). I did not contact the Prime Minister, nor did I initially contact the Mayor directly. However, later that day I appeared before the MPA and it was during this meeting that the details of Mr Wallis' contract with the MPS leaked to the media. I later briefed the Mayor. I have explained above why I had no reason, prior to being made aware that Neil Wallis was of interest to Operation Weeting, to be at all concerned about DPA's contractual relationship with him. He was, of course, no longer working

for the MPS at this time. Further, to have raised the issue with the Prime Minister or the Mayor once Mr Wallis became of interest to Operation Weeting might have improperly compromised the Prime Minister or Mayor, or have improperly placed suspicion on Mr Wallis, against whom there may have been no further action taken.

85. My stance in this regard appears to have been consistent with the advice to John Yates from a senior official in Number 10 to the effect that this matter should not be discussed with the Prime Minister. Additionally, these were extraordinary circumstances as I made clear in my resignation address (which is exhibited as SPS/3) and as I explained to the Home Affairs Select Committee on 19th July 2011 (transcript exhibited at SPS/4). I had never previously told a Prime Minister about MPS internal contracts, nor the identification of a suspect, nor our intention to make an arrest, and I would not have done so here, especially given the particular circumstances of this case.
86. I had no part whatsoever in Mr Wallis' daughter securing work at the MPS. I do not recall having any knowledge of the matter and only became aware of her being employed by the MPS during the weekend of my resignation.
87. I am asked whether I know whether or not it is true that Neil Wallis sold crime stories to the media whilst engaged by the MPS. I do not know if it is true - I am only aware of what has been alleged in the media. This is a most disturbing allegation, and if it is true, would be both disappointing and embarrassing for the MPS.

88. As I explained in my evidence to the Select Committee on 19th July 2011, with the benefit of hindsight I regret that the MPS entered into a contract with Mr Wallis.
89. On several occasions after Operation Weeting had started and I had returned from sick leave, the Chair of the MPA, Kit Malthouse, expressed a view that we should not be devoting this level of resources to the phone hacking inquiry as a consequence of a largely political and media-driven "level of hysteria". Whilst understanding his desire to maximise the resources devoted to current issues of crime and public safety, I pointed out that the disclosure requirements arising from the civil cases left us with little choice but to invest significant resources in servicing this matter. Additionally the nature of some of the revelations of media behaviour, particularly towards vulnerable members of the public, made a reopening of the investigation inevitable, from an operational viewpoint.

Metropolitan Police Authority

Q63 - What role did the Metropolitan Police Authority play in relation to oversight of the Metropolitan Police Service's relations and communications with the media? Did you consider that it would be in the public interest to make any changes to this role? If so, what changes?

Q64 - What level of contact and oversight was there from the MPA in relation to the MPS' relations and communications with the media?

Q65 - What level of contact and oversight was there from the MPA in relation to the MPS' policing of offences committed, or suspected as having been committed, by the media?

90. I am aware that the MPA ceased to exist on 16th January 2012 and that from this date the MOPC came into effect. When I held the position of Commissioner I met formally and publicly with the full Police Authority each month. Additionally, I and the Deputy Commissioner met the Chair

and Chief Executive for informal discussions every Friday morning. I would also occasionally meet other members of the MPA. There was additional contact with the Chair and the Chief Executive as necessary. In this way the MPA had full oversight of policing issues.

91. The MPA was able to scrutinise any aspect of the MPS work and this responsibility has now passed to the MOPC.

The MPS' Investigation into Phone Hacking

Q69 - What is your view now, with the benefit of hindsight, of the decisions that were taken as to the decision: (a) to prosecute Glenn Mulcaire and Clive Goodman; and (b) the lack of further investigation at the time?

Q70 - To what extent (if any), and in what way, and for what reasons, were any of the following important factors in the decision to prosecute Glenn Mulcaire and Clive Goodman in 2006/7 and to go no further at that time:

The CPS' view of the law,

The MPS' view of the law.

Counsel's view of the law.

The depth and extent to which phone hacking at the News of the World was investigated (please explain any failure fully to investigate at the time),

Sufficiency of evidence.

Media lobbying.

Political lobbying.

Your views at the time.

Any other material factor (please identify any such factors).

Q71 - When, how and from whom did you first learn that the Metropolitan Police Service had evidence in relation to phone hacking which had not been satisfactorily acted upon? What did you do about that when you did realise (please include in this answer any discussions, formal or informal, identifying the participants)?

Q77 - What communications, if any, whether formal or informal, did you have with Assistant Commissioner John Yates in relation to the review of the phone hacking investigation conducted in 2009, or with anyone else who was connected with the phone hacking investigation conducted in 2009?

Q72 - Was there any political lobbying in relation to the MPS' handling of the phone hacking investigation and subsequent prosecutions in 2006/7? If so, please describe the same and identify the source of the lobbying.

Q73 - Was there any media lobbying in relation to the MPS' handling of the phone hacking investigation and subsequent prosecutions in 2006/7. If so, please describe the same

Q74 - What communications (if any) were you aware of as between the MPS and anyone employed by the Murdoch empire in relation to the investigation and prosecution of phone hacking by, or on behalf of, the News of the World in 2006/7?

Q75 - Were there any such communications between other parts of the media and the MPS? If so, please explain.

Q76 - To what extent was the phone hacking investigation and prosecutions in 2006/7 a matter which was dealt with, or considered (in any way, whether formally or informally) at Commissioner level and/or with your senior management team?

Q78 - What communications, if any, did you have with the Guardian after they reported on the phone hacking story in July 2009?

92. I have been asked to comment upon certain aspects of Operation Caryatid, the MPS' initial investigation into phone hacking. Without having examined the case papers and being privy to the rationale underpinning police and CPS decisions and Counsel's advice, this is not something I can usefully comment upon. However, I am aware of the evidence provided to the Home Affairs Select Committee by Peter Clarke, former Acting/Assistant Commissioner of the MPS and the senior responsible officer for the investigation in 06/07. I accept what he says. In my view Mr Clarke is a man of the highest integrity and one of the finest police officers of his generation.

93. As someone who had neither a role in, nor any knowledge of, the investigation beyond what was in the public domain at the time, I can offer no further relevant view. I was not personally involved in the original investigation and I had no knowledge of the parameters which had been set for that investigation.

94. Once I became Commissioner, I did have communications with Assistant Commissioner (AC) John Yates with regard to the issue of phone hacking, when further allegations were made. After listening to a Radio 4 broadcast on 9 July 2009 about phone hacking allegations in the *Guardian* I telephoned him and asked him to establish the facts of the case and look into the detail of the *Guardian's* allegations. This was my

initial involvement in the issue of phone hacking. It is a matter of public record that AC Yates concluded that no additional evidence had come to light since the original case had concluded, that that case had been scrutinised in detail by both the CPS and leading Counsel and that no further investigation was required.

95. Following this I continued to have intermittent discussions with AC Yates as the *Guardian* maintained its coverage on this issue. I continued to be reassured by him that there was nothing new in the allegations that would warrant the reopening of the investigation and investment of significant additional resources. However, he informed me that he intended to keep the matter under review subject to any new evidence coming to light.
96. On 1 September 2010 an article was published in the *New York Times*, in which apparently fresh allegations were made about phone hacking. I understood that AC Yates undertook a scoping exercise at this time and put a new team in place to complete this task. This was known as Operation Varec. In December 2010 I was aware that the results of this work were referred to the CPS. I am told that they concluded there was insufficient evidence to mount a prosecution. Again, there was no reason for me to think the issue had not been satisfactorily dealt with. However, it was in December 2010 that I took a leave of absence due to ill-health. The investigation team, AC Yates or Tim Godwin, who was Acting Commissioner, would have had any further knowledge of the outcome of Operation Varec from this point onwards.

97. Although I was aware from these discussions and AC Yates' public comments that a strategy for dealing with people who may have been exposed to the practice of phone hacking had been developed by the original investigating team and service providers, I was unaware that this strategy had not been implemented as expected. I was also unaware that there was substantial material that had not been satisfactorily dealt with by that original investigation. Indeed my belief, based upon discussions with, and assurances from, AC Yates, was that the original investigation and prosecution strategy had successfully tested relatively new legislation covering a somewhat technical and now illegal practice.
98. It was only after the reopening of the investigation through the establishment of Operation Weeting during my absence from office on sick leave that I became aware that there were issues of substance for further investigation. Up until this point I had no reason to suspect that the initial investigation was other than entirely successful.
99. I do not recall having any substantive or detailed discussions about phone hacking with anyone else during this period. Indeed, it is fair to say that set against the other issues facing the MPS (including counter-terrorism issues, the investigation into the "night-stalker", the re-investigation of the murder of Stephen Lawrence, very real budgetary challenges, the Olympic security preparations, Government proposals for significant changes to the governance arrangements for the police and national structures for dealing with serious and organised crime) phone hacking was not a matter which I prioritised. I was satisfied that it was being overseen by a highly experienced and very senior officer. I was

reassured by the fact that to my knowledge the case had been reviewed by the CPS and by counsel.

100. On 10th December 2009, accompanied by Dick Fedorcio, I went to see the Editor of the *Guardian* newspaper, Alan Rusbridger. From recollection I believe there was one other person present at that meeting from the newspaper. In itself it was not unusual for me to go and see national newspaper editors and their senior staff for reasons I have outlined earlier. I had previously visited Mr Rusbridger and colleagues in his office. However, it is also true that the *Guardian's* continued campaign relating to phone hacking and their obvious disagreement with the position being taken by AC Yates concerned me, and so I considered a direct discussion to better understand this would be useful. Not to have had a meeting when the MPS was effectively being accused by a respected national newspaper of conspiracy with News International would, I believe, have been irresponsible. I did not believe I could persuade Mr Rusbridger to drop their campaign, nor indeed did I seek to do so. It would have been naïve to believe I could. That was not my purpose. My purpose was to try to understand the *Guardian's* position because I could not understand why they would not accept the assurances they and I had received from AC Yates. Although I do not remember the details of the discussion I believe I outlined the briefings I had been given by AC Yates regarding phone hacking as he saw it.

101. Although our exchange remained perfectly civilized it was clear that Mr Rusbridger and his colleague took a very different view to that held by AC Yates. I recollect that, in the interests of trying to resolve these

differences of view, I suggested they have a further meeting with AC Yates, as he would have the detail to support his position. I understand that this meeting did take place.

102. I do not recall any other communication with the *Guardian* about phone hacking, although it is likely that *Guardian* correspondents asked associated questions during my monthly question and answer sessions with the collective CRA.

"Media Crime"

Q79 - What levels of awareness and experience were there in the Metropolitan Police Service of "media crime" and in particular: (a) unlawful interception of communications (including the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act); (b) bribery of officials by the media; (c) blackmail; (d) harassment by paparazzi and journalists; (e) traffic and/or public order offences committed by photographers and journalists pursuing stories; (f) inciting officials to communicate confidential information held by the MPS / conspiring with them to obtain such information; and (g) crime within media organisations other than the foregoing (e.g. dishonest expense claims).

Q80 - What sort of priority was given to, and what level of resources are available to deal with, the above.

Q81 - Whilst you were the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis did contact with the IPCC and/or the Surveillance Commissioner and/or the Information Commissioner ever give rise to questions about the leakage of information to the media and/or private detectives? If so, please explain?

103. The term "media crime" is not reflected in law or in operational police terminology. However, there is an awareness within the MPS, and in particular within the DPS, of media-related crimes. There is wide ranging knowledge of the offences mentioned. Any of the matters listed in the question would be dealt with as an individual allegation, and the relevance of the "media" aspect would be addressed on a case-by-case basis.

104. The resources allocated to such investigations would be a local matter and fall within the priority levels set for the type of crime. For example traffic and/or public order offences committed by photographers and journalists pursuing stories would likely be dealt with at borough level. Responsible investigating officers would make resourcing decisions based upon the specific allegations. Inciting officials to communicate confidential information held by the MPS or conspiring with them to obtain such information would be dealt with by the DPS.
105. Where MPS personnel were involved in unlawful interception of communications (including breaches of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act), bribery of officials by the media, blackmail or inciting or conspiring with officials to communicate confidential information, such matters would be viewed with extreme seriousness and would be subject of a comprehensive investigation by the DPS. Such investigations would be supported by whatever levels of resources were required for the proper conduct of the enquiry.
106. I am aware that there have been a number of investigations/enquiries undertaken into leaks, or suspected leaks, from MPS personnel to journalists or private detectives. There are set protocols in place for dealing with contact from the Office of the Surveillance Commissioner and the Independent Police Complaints Commission but such contacts were the responsibility of other parts of the MPS. The relevant ACPO Commander is made aware and the Management Board is briefed only as appropriate.

HMIC

Q83 - What is your view of the recommendations contained in the HMIC's recent report "Without Fear or Favour"?

Q84 - Do you consider that there are further steps which could and/or should be taken to ensure that relationships between the police and the media are and remain appropriate?

Q85 - From your own experience of HMIC, is the HMIC sufficiently equipped to provide sufficient oversight of relations between the police and the media? What improvements might realistically be made to the system in this regard?

107. I have read "Without Fear or Favour". It is a sound piece of work and I agree with its conclusions. It reflects much of what I put in place and has been built upon by my successor.

108. I am asked about HMIC oversight of media-police relations. One definition of oversight is of course supervision – it has never been the function of HMIC to supervise police, and neither could nor should they. The issue is about personal and organisational values, professionalism and integrity accompanied by effective communication and appropriate checks and balances for the creation and maintenance of confidence. That must come from within the organization and cannot be imposed from outside.

Chief Constable of the Lancashire Police

Q86 - Describe the personal contact which you had with the media whilst Chief Constable of the Lancashire Police. The Inquiry would like an overall picture of the type, frequency, duration and content of your contact with the media during your tenure as Chief Constable of the Lancashire Police.

Q87 - Describe what you were seeking to gain for the Lancashire Police through your personal contacts with the media.

Q88 - Describe in general terms and using illustrative examples what you consider the media has been seeking from you in your personal dealing with them during your time as Chief Constable of the Lancashire Police.

Q89 - To what extent did you accept hospitality from the media whilst Chief Constable of the

Lancashire Police?

Q90 - Insofar as you accepted hospitality from the media, what was the nature of the hospitality that you accepted?

Q91 - What did you consider that the media was seeking to gain from affording you hospitality?

Q92 - To what extent did you provide hospitality for the media on behalf of the Lancashire Police whilst you were the Chief Constable of that force?

Q93 - Insofar as you provided hospitality to the media, what was the nature of the hospitality that you provided?

Q94 - What were you seeking to gain by affording hospitality for the media?

Q95 - What mechanisms were in place to monitor and record hospitality as between the Chief Constable of Lancashire and the media?

Q96 - What mechanisms were in place to monitor and record meetings with the media generally?

Q97 - Did you ever discuss the media, or media coverage, with politicians whilst Chief Constable of Lancashire? If so, how important is such communication and why?

Q98 - Whilst you were the Chief Constable of Lancashire Police did you ever know or sense that a politician was putting pressure on you to take a particular course of action as a result of lobbying or influence exerted on that politician by the media? If so, please explain (although you need not identify the politician at this stage if you do not wish to do so).

Q99 - Did the prominence which politicians gave to subjects ever give rise to pressure to alter policing priorities so as to allocate more priority to the subject being given prominence by the politicians? If so, please explain.

Q100 - Set out your understanding of the type of contact which Lancashire Police personnel had whilst you served with the force with the media covering nature, extent, frequency and (in general terms) topics / content.

Q101 - Were contacts with the media restricted to certain staff or were all staff able to deal with the media?

Q102 - What did you expect the Lancashire Police to gain from such contacts with the media?

Q103 - What did the media seek from such contacts with your personnel?

Q104 - What hospitality were your personnel permitted to accept from the media? Inter alia, were they entitled to accept a meal or a drink from a journalist?

Q105 - What hospitality were your personnel permitted to afford to the media?

Q106 - What mechanisms were in place to record hospitality as between the media and your personnel?

Q107 - How (if at all) was hospitality between the Lancashire Police (including yourself) and the media policed?

Q108 - Were the hospitality rules governing contact between Lancashire Police personnel (including yourself) and the media different from those covering contact with other third parties? If so, what were the differences?

Q109 - What policies and procedures were in place to record contact between: (a) yourself and the media; (b) senior managers and the media; (c) other personnel and the media, for the avoidance of doubt, the reply to this request should cover both on the record and off the record contacts?

Q110 - Were records of hospitality and/or contact with the media audited and/or policed and, if so, how and by whom?

Q111 - In your opinion did the policies and procedures described above: (a) work effectively; (b) were they sufficient; and (c) were they capable of improvement?

Q112 - What systems, policies and procedures were in place in the Lancashire police to ensure that all members of the force (including civilian employees) knew what was and what was not appropriate contact with the media?

Q113 - Are you satisfied that the policies and procedures described above were sufficient and working effectively?

Q114 - What training was in place in the Lancashire Police, whilst you were Chief Constable, to ensure that all members of the force (including civilian employees) knew what was and what was not appropriate contact with the media?

Q115 - To what extent were leaks from the Lancashire Police to the media a problem during your tenure as Chief Constable?

Q116 - What systems and procedures were in place to identify, respond to and detect the source of leaks?

Q117 - How many investigations were conducted into actual or suspected leaks from the Lancashire Police to the media during your tenure as Chief Constable (if you cannot access statistics please state your recollection in subjective terms as best you can) and how many led to the successful identification of the source of the leak. What was the outcome of the other investigations to the best of your recollection?

Q118 - Was disciplinary action been taken against any member of staff (whether civilian or uniformed) for leaking information to the media during your tenure as Chief Constable of Lancashire Police? If so, please identify the number of cases and their outcome. There is no need to identify the person or persons the subject of the disciplinary process.

Q119 - To the best of your recollection what procedures were in place to prevent and/or detect data leaks?

Q120 - To the best of your recollection what protections (if any) were in place to ensure that databases used by Lancashire Police, including the CISS internal crime system, personnel were not misused?

Q121 - What payments (if any) were considered to be legitimate financial transactions between Lancashire Police personnel and the media?

Q122 - To what extent did you believe bribery of personnel by the media to be a current problem for the Lancashire Police (if at all)?

Q123 - What steps were taken: (a) to educate your personnel about bribery; (b) otherwise to prevent the bribery of your personnel; (c) pro-actively to detect bribery; (d) retrospectively to investigate bribery; and (e) to discipline personnel (if any) who were found to have accepted bribes from the media?

Q124 - What role did the Lancashire Police Service Press Office fulfil? What, in practice, did it do?

Q125 - To what extent did the Lancashire Police Press Office exist to manage the Lancashire Police's corporate image?

Q126 - Why was it necessary for the Lancashire Police to have a press office and what is your view as to its utility and role?

Q127 - What was the media's attitude towards the Lancashire Police Press Office? In particular, were they satisfied by the provision of information and the routing of communications through your press office or did they prefer direct contact with individual persons within the MPS?

Q128 - What role did the Lancashire Police Authority play in relation to oversight of the Lancashire Police's relations and communications with the media? Do you consider that it would be in the public interest to make any changes to this role? If so, what changes?

Q129 - What level of contact and oversight was there from the Lancashire Police Authority in relation to the Lancashire Police's relations and communications with the media whilst you were the Chief Constable?

Q130 - What level of contact and oversight was there from the Lancashire Police in relation to the Lancashire Police's policing of the media whilst you were the Chief Constable?

Q131 - What limitations, if any, were there on staff from the Lancashire Police leaving to work for the media and vice versa?

Q132 - Were records kept of those who joined the Lancashire Police from the media, or who went on to work for the media after leaving the Lancashire Police? If so, please describe the systems in place to the best of your recollection.

Q133 - To the best of your recollection were there any discernible patterns in the movement of personnel from the media into the Lancashire Police and vice versa?

Q134 - What level of awareness and experience were there in the Lancashire Police of "media crime" and in particular: (a) unlawful interception of communications (including the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000); (b) bribery of officials by the media; (c) blackmail; (d) harassment by paparazzi and journalists; (e) traffic and/or public order offences committed by photographers and journalists pursuing stories; (f) inciting officials to communicate confidential information held by the Lancashire Police / conspiring with them to obtain such information; and (g) crime within media organisations other than the foregoing (e.g. dishonest expense claims)?

Q135 - What sort of priority was given to, and what level of resources were available to deal with the above?

Q136 - Whilst you were the Chief Constable of Lancashire Police did contact with the IPCC and/or the Surveillance Commissioner and/or the Information Commissioner ever give rise to questions about leakage of information to the media and/or private detectives? If so, please explain.

Q137 - What was your impression of the culture within the Lancashire Police overall in relation to its dealings with the press?

109. I left the Lancashire Constabulary in February 2005, some seven years ago, and as a result I cannot recall all events or policies around that time in detail. In an attempt to assist the Inquiry I have made enquiries of

Lancashire police. The following paragraphs set out what I understand to be the position in the light of the responses to those enquiries.

110. The Gifts and Hospitality policy for Lancashire Police during my tenure as Chief Constable (which is exhibited as SPS/5) sets out the general principle that gifts and hospitality should not be accepted. However, where acceptance of gifts or hospitality was unavoidable or where refusal would cause offence or embarrassment, the officer or staff member's line manager had to be informed and, if possible, had to approve the hospitality in advance. It was also a requirement that a record of any gifts or hospitality was made in a register, kept by each divisional commander or department head. This register was periodically checked by the Standards and Leadership Group. There was no specific policy governing gifts or hospitality received from, or provided to, the media - the same policy applied to any third party. The only hospitality that Lancashire Police personnel would be permitted to afford to the media would have been on-site refreshments provided at pre-planned press briefings.

111. Any gifts and hospitality I received or provided would have been recorded in the register, in line with this policy. Any meetings with the media would have been recorded in my 'Outlook' calendar/diary (as with any other meeting). The relevant gifts and hospitality register at Lancashire Police has been checked for the period during which I served as Chief Constable, and there is no record of any hospitality accepted from the media. My diary is unfortunately no longer available and I cannot now recall what hospitality, if any, I accepted or provided. I have

described earlier in this statement the kind of contacts and meetings I had with the media whilst serving with the Lancashire Constabulary.

112. The media policy during my time at Lancashire Police allowed any member of the Constabulary to speak to the media in appropriate circumstances. Such circumstances would include, for example, if he/she was the officer in the case, had been nominated to speak to the media by the officer in charge or a more senior officer, or had sufficient overview of the relevant information to make an informed decision on what to release to the media. Whilst all members of the Constabulary had authority to speak to the media where appropriate, senior managers were expected to take the lead on speaking about more serious types of incident or Constabulary-wide issues. The Senior Investigating Officer would take the lead on media handling during major criminal inquiries, with the assistance of the Headquarters Press Office. More generally, media enquiries could be referred to the HQ Press Office or division-based communications officers. Enquiries about more serious incidents would routinely be referred to the HQ Press Office.

113. In practice, contact with the media could take the form of telephone calls, emails or face-to-face meetings. Due to the nature and unpredictability of police work, the frequency of contact about a particular issue or incident varied considerably, depending on the particular news outlet, the nature of an incident, or the level of general interest in the Constabulary at the time. The HQ Press Office used a system called Press Bureau to record all enquiries from the media and all responses given. Where media contact took place via the HQ Press Office or divisional communications

officers, a record of the contact and any official responses given would have been made on the Press Bureau system. This record would also have included any guidance provided 'off the record' to assist with accurate reporting. However, there was no mechanism in place to monitor or record meetings with the media, whether 'on the record' or 'off the record', which took place without HQ Press Office or communications officer involvement.

114. As far as I am aware, the Press Bureau system was never audited, although records held on it were sometimes used for disclosure purposes, for example as part of the Operation Lund trial in 2004-2006 (the Morecambe Bay cockle-pickers case).

115. The role of the HQ Press Office was to handle calls from the media and ensure that information was provided to journalists in line with the media policy and procedure. In practice, its remit included:

- a. Taking calls from the media and recording them on Press Bureau;
- b. Developing statements in relation to calls received and issuing them to journalists;
- c. Writing and issuing press releases, covering a range of topics pertinent to the Constabulary's activity at that time;
- d. Assisting officers to make appeals for information via the media;
- e. Facilitating press briefings;

- f. Formulating the media policy in line with national guidance;
- g. Assisting with provision of information during major or critical incidents;
- h. Providing an out-of-hours on-call service for the media.

116. The HQ Press Office's main role was not to manage the Constabulary's corporate image, although clearly any statements it developed and press releases it issued had the potential to impact on the Force's image negatively or positively depending on the angle taken by the media. In my view it was important for the Lancashire Police to have a Press Office. The need was not nearly anything like as great as that of the MPS, but it was still essential that the Force was as open and transparent as possible with the media and that we had professionally qualified individuals to ensure the appropriate services were provided. The public rely on the media as a source of information even now, and did so all the more in 2002-2005, which was before social networking really took off.

117. I believe that the media had some frustrations on occasions with the service provided by the HQ Press Office, mainly to do with the timeliness of responses and the opening hours. These issues were addressed and the situation improved. However, because the media had the opportunity to speak to officers directly where appropriate, as well as having a Press Office facility, I do not remember any complaints about not having direct contact with individual personnel.

118. The media policy and procedure was shaped by, and formulated in line with, the guidance produced by the ACPO Media Advisory Group (now Communications Advisory Group). The general principle for relations with the media was "withhold only what you must". I have explained above, in the context of the MPS, my general views as to why good media relations are important. During my time with the Lancashire Constabulary, we similarly considered provision of timely, accurate and relevant information to the public to be vitally important in increasing public confidence about crime and policing matters, so encouraging positive working relationships with the media was crucial. Many people never come into direct contact with the police, but still require information to help keep themselves safe, prevent and reduce crime and contribute to investigations. We therefore sought to have effective contacts with the media to ensure that relevant information got into the public domain and reached such people as quickly and effectively as possible. Media contacts enabled the Constabulary to reach a far wider audience than it could possibly reach on its own. The local media, in particular, were seen as an important source of information for many people.

119. In terms of what the media sought from contact with police personnel during my time at Lancashire Constabulary, they would ordinarily be looking for updates on specific investigations or appeals. I assume they would also sometimes be looking for answers to questions posed to them by their readers, listeners and viewers about policing matters.

120. The media policy was available to all officers and staff via the Lancashire Police intranet site. In 2003-2004 we also conducted media

training for Inspectors and Chief Inspectors (who had more regular contact with the media). The training took the form of a two-day course. It was skills-based and, although the rules on disclosure of information were covered (such as ensuring that no information was released that could prejudice any future court case or identify victims or offenders), there was nothing in the course that related specifically to the ethics of relationships with the media. It was not seen as necessary to cover this topic, as the Constabulary had never had any previous problems with inappropriate media relations.

121. Whilst policies and procedures are probably always capable of improvement to reflect changing circumstances, I am satisfied that those in place during my tenure seemed to be sufficient and to work effectively.

122. I do not recall any problems with leaks from Lancashire Police to the media during my time as Chief Constable. The Professional Standards Department (PSD) had responsibility for preventing data leaks and ensuring that databases used by Lancashire Police were not misused. The PSD would also have had responsibility for investigating any allegations of leaks, but I am informed that there is no record of any investigations, disciplinary actions or misconduct proceedings relating to leaks in the relevant period.

123. I do not believe bribery of police personnel was a significant problem in Lancashire and I understand there were no recorded instances of leaks or bribery during my tenure as Chief Constable.

124. To my knowledge there were no limitations on staff from the Lancashire Police leaving to work for the media or vice versa, and no records were specifically kept about such movements. There were only ever up to four press officers employed by the Constabulary during my tenure as Chief Constable. There was little, if any, movement in and out of the Press Office and therefore no patterns of movement to speak of.

125. I do not recall any communication with the IPCC, Surveillance Commissioner or Information Commissioner about leaks of information during my time as Chief Constable of Lancashire, and I am informed there are no records of any such communication.

126. I have been asked questions about the oversight role of the Lancashire Police Authority. In general the manner in which they discharged their role of governance appeared to work satisfactorily and reflected national arrangements, with operational issues being a matter for the chief constable.

127. Overall, I felt that the culture of the dealings between the Lancashire Police and the media was positive, open and transparent. As noted above, there was considerably less media interest than there was in the workings of the MPS, and most of the attention we did receive was from local, not national, media.

My Resignation

Q21 - Did you discuss your intention to resign with any member of your Police Authority or any politician before you resigned? If so, please identify the politician and summarise the gist of the conversation / communication

Q22 - Were you in any way (whether explicitly or implicitly) encouraged to, or advised to

resign by any member of your Police Authority or any politician? If so, please give full particulars. The Inquiry would be particularly interested, if this was the case, to know whether there was any hint of the press having influenced the member of the Police Authority's or the politician's conduct.

Q23 - Do you stand by your retirement statement? Is there anything that you would like to add to it in the light of developments since you resigned?

128. Prior to publishing my resignation statement on Sunday 17th July 2011 I informed the Palace, the Home Secretary and the Mayor of my decision to resign. In addition I told the Chair of the MPA. I contacted them not for a discussion, but out of courtesy to make my intentions clear. Far from being encouraged or advised to resign, it was clear to me that both the Home Secretary and the Mayor were shocked, expressing full support for me to stay in office. I did not discuss my intention with any other politician or member of the MPA.

129. I stand by my resignation statement. It is unfortunate that these matters unfolded shortly after I had suffered serious illness. To stay and take a risk on any personal lack of resilience as a consequence of my ill-health in the face of such an important and demanding forthcoming year for the Met and the country, whilst also dealing with the distractions emanating out of the phone hacking affair, may have served my personal wishes, but would, in my opinion, have been an unprofessional and dishonourable course of action. I needed no-one's advice to come to that conclusion.

130. It is widely acknowledged throughout the police world that the role of the MPS Commissioner is uniquely challenging. I had become accustomed to confronting and dealing with those challenges. However, it was clear to me at the time of my resignation that the combination of illness, injury,

bouts of major surgery and continuing discomfort had significantly affected my level of personal resilience. For this reason and for those reasons set out in my resignation statement, it was right that I stood down.

131. I also recognised in my resignation speech that as difficult, as the phone hacking issue has been on both a personal and organizational level, it also represented a "point in time" for the MPS. This was an opportunity for further change and was one of the reasons why I appointed Elizabeth Filkin to her task.

I believe the facts stated in this witness statement are true

Signed....

Dated..... 20.2.12
